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I. INTRODUCTION
'"[WVords are chameleons,
which reflect the color of their environment ...."
Commissioner v. National Carbide Co.,
167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948)(L. Hand, J.)
In Nebraska, physicians, lawyers, accountants, architects, engi-
neers, medical technicians, and certain investment advisors render
"professional" services,1 but real estate brokers do not--that is, for
purposes of Nebraska's professional negligence statute of limitations,
section 25-222 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska ("25-222").3 As evi-
denced by this summary of Nebraska law, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has repeatedly used a definitional, classificatory approach in de-
termining to whom the statute's protection may be extended. That is,
the court has focused on who ranks as a "professional" before allowing
certain parties to use 25-222 as a defense. To determine which occupa-
* Special thanks go to Professor Craig M. Lawson at the University of Nebraska
College of Law for his substantive suggestions on this Note.
1. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
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tions are "professions," the court has long adhered to one definition of
"professional,"4 which was recently modified in Tylle v. Zoucha,s a
case holding that real estate brokers were not professionals for pur-
poses of 25-222. The court's continued attempt to apply a definition
that will necessarily change and grow as our society continues to ex-
pand its perception of "professionals" only will provoke constant liti-
gation, challenging the modern meaning of the definition.
Focusing on the line of cases in which the court has utilized this
definitional approach to 25-222,6 this Note analyzes the development
of the statute and the logic behind the court's classificatory interpreta-
tion of the statute. This Note concludes that by enacting 25-222, the
Nebraska Legislature did not intend to separate particular professions
from others for statute of limitations purposes. Instead, the intention
was to separate professional negligence claims, based on the breach of
a professional standard of care, from ordinary negligence claims, based
on the breach of the reasonable person standard of care. This conclu-
sion is supported by an examination of the statutory language selected
for 25-222, the principles of professional negligence, and the legislative
history leading to the passage of the statute.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF 25-222
A. History
Before the Nebraska Legislature enacted 25-222, malpractice 7 ac-
tions were governed by section 25-208,8 which provided a two-year lim-
4. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
5. 226 Neb. 476, 480, 412 N.W.2d 438, 440-41 (1987).
6. See infra notes 30-100 and accompanying text.
7. "M1alpractice" was not defined in NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1964) (amended 1972).
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the following definition from Webster's
New International Dictionary:. "The treatment of a case by a surgeon or physician
in a manner contrary to accepted rules and with injurious results to the patient;
hence, any professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in
the performance of professional or fiduciary duties." Toman v. Creighton Memo-
rial St. Josephs Hosp., Inc., 191 Neb. 751,758,217 N.W.2d 484,489 (1974); Stacey v.
Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 697, 131 N.W.2d 163,165 (1964); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb.
656, 661, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1941).
8. Section 25-208 provided.
Actions for libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, malpractice, penalty, forfeiture, recovery of tax. The following
actions can only be brought within the periods herein stated: Within one
year, an action for libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, or an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfei-
ture, but where the statute giving such action prescribes a different limi-
tation, the action may be brought within the period so limited; within
two years, an action for malpractice. In the absence of any other shorter
applicable statute of limitations, any action for the recovery of any excise
or other tax, which has been collected under any statute of the State of
Nebraska, which has been finally adjudged to be unconstitutional, shall
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itation period in allowing claims to be brought by injured plaintiffs.
This two-year time frame led to harsh results when the act or omis-
sion that created the damage was part of a long series of medical treat-
ments for the same condition, or when the negligence was not
discovered within the two-year period. In response to these situations,
the Nebraska Supreme Court created the "end of treatment rule";
that is, the statute of limitations began to run when the medical treat-
ment ended.9 This rule was later abandoned in favor of the "discovery
rule." The advent of the discovery rule occurred in a case where the
plaintiff alleged that a physician negligently left a foreign object in
her body.10 The court stated that a cause of action did not accrue,
thereby commencing the period of limitation, until the plaintiff dis-
covered, or reasonably should have discovered, the foreign object in
her body."1 The discovery rule subsequently was extended from for-
eign object cases to any type of malpractice case against a physician.12
Also leading to the passage of 25-222 was the increasing amount of
malpractice and products liability litigation,'3 causing insurance com-
panies to either cease coverage for these types of actions or raise rates
to prohibitive levels.14 The exorbitant insurance rates were being
passed to the public in fees for the services rendered.' 5 These factors
evidenced a need for a statute of limitations which put a constraint on
the time period in which various malpractice and products liability
suits could be commenced. Such a time limit would reduce the insur-
ers' risk of extending coverage to potential defendants, thereby lower-
ing insurance rates.
The development of the discovery rule in Nebraska and the per-
ceived nationwide malpractice crises' 6 created dual concerns: the in-
be brought within one year after the final decision of the court declaring
it to be unconstitutional.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-208 (1964)(amended 1972)(emphasis added).
9. Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 663, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1941). This rule has been
recognized after the advent of the discovery rule in Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 294-95, 338 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (1983)(continuous treat-
ment rule recognized in accounting malpractice case); Smith v. Dewey, 214 Neb.
605, 611, 335 N.W.2d 530, 533 (1983). The continuous treatment or relationship
theory was also discussed in Frezell v. Iwersen, 231 Neb. 365, 436 N.W.2d 194
(1989); Ames v. Hehner, 231 Neb. 152, 435 N.W.2d 869 (1989); McCook Equity Ex-
change v. Cooperative Serv. Co., 230 Neb. 758, 433 N.W.2d 509 (1988); Norfolk Iron
& Metal v. Behnke, 230 Neb. 414, 432 N.W.2d 18 (1988); Kelly Klosure v. Johnson
Grant & Co., 229 Neb. 369, 427 N.W.2d 44 (1988).
10. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962).
11. Id. at 43, 115 N.W.2d at 585.
12. Acker v. Sorensen, 183 Neb. 866, 871, 165 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1969)("[T]he rule of
Spath v. Morrow was intended to apply broadly.").
13. W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KE TON ON TORTS § 30, at 167-68 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 586, 244 N.W.2d 201, 204 (1976).
15. Id.
16. W.P. KEETON, supra note 13, at 168.
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justice of a statute of limitations that could bar a plaintiff's action
before he or she has suffered injury17 and the additional inequity of
leaving the defendant indefinitely vulnerable to suit.'8 These con-
cerns prompted the Nebraska Legislature to amend 25-20819 and enact
25-222 in 1972.20 The statute currently reads:
25-222. Actions on professional negligence. Any action to recover damages based
on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in ren-
dering or failure to render professional services shall be commenced within
17. Logic therefore would seem to tell us that if one knowing of the exist-
ence of a cause of action must be given a reasonable period of time to file
suit, one cannot have that right legislatively extinguished before the in-
dividual either knows of the right or, with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could know of such right.
Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 824-25, 341 N.W.2d 326, 331 (1983)(Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring).
18. W.P. KErrON, supra note 13, § 30, at 167.
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1964) was amended as indicated in italics below.
25-208. Actions for libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment, ma-
licious prosecution, malpractice, penalty, forfeiture, recovery of tax. The fol-
lowing actions can only be brought within the periods herein stated:
Within one year, an action for libel, slander, assault and battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or an action upon a statute for a
penalty or forfeiture, but where the statute giving such action prescribes
a different limitation, the action may be brought within the period so
limited; within two years, an action for malpractice which is not other-
wise specikclly limited by statute. In the absence of any other shorter
applicable statute of limitations, any action for the recovery of an excise
or other tax, which has been collected under any statute of the State of
Nebraska, which has been finally adjudged to be unconstitutional, shall
be brought within one year after the final decision of the court declaring
it to be unconstitutional.
L.B. 3132, 82d Log., 2d Sess. (1972); 1972 Neb. Laws 637. This statute reads as
amended at the time of this writing. The current relationship between 25-208 and
25-222 regarding malpractice and professional negligence has not been expressly
declared by Nebraska's Legislature or Supreme Court. However, since Nebraska
has adhered to such a broad definition of malpractice ("any professional miscon-
duct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of profes-
sional or fiduciary duties," see supra note 7), it is conceivable that 25-222 concerns
professional negligence only, whereas 25-208 covers any professional misconduct,
not solely negligence.
After the enactment of 25-222, section 25-208 was applied in tandem with 25-
222 in Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 145 v. Nye, 216 Neb. 354,343 N.W.2d 753
(1984)(legal malpractice) and Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201
(1976)(medical malpractice; only section 25-208 applied since acts at issue oc-
curred in 1968, before 25-222 was adopted).
As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end,
and it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not
yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent
only when it ceases to grow.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 36 (1881), reprinted in S. PRESSER & J.
ZAiNALDiN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 731 (2d ed. 1989).
20. L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (1972); 1972 Neb. Laws 637.
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two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to
render professional services providing the basis for such action; Provided, if
the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered
within such two-year period, then the action may be commenced within one
year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts
which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier;, and pro-
vided further, that in no event may any action be commenced to recover dam-
ages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure
to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering
or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the
cause of action.
2 1
The statute sets forth a two-year limitation in the first clause, with
the second clause modifying the first "by codifying the discovery
rule."22 The last clause "limits the impact of the discovery rule,"23
thereby satisfying the competing concerns in favor of both the plain-
tiff with an undiscovered injury and the defendant with an indefinite
vulnerability to a lawsuit.
B. Nebraska Supreme Court Interpretation
The Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted 25-222 by articulat-
ing the character and purpose of the statute, as well as by upholding
its constitutionality in several cases. The court's constitutional analy-
sis has focused on the determination of who is a "professional" within
the meaning of 25-222.
Based on the language of 25-222, the court has characterized the
statute as the occurrence rule, tempered by discovery.24 The occur-
rence rule states that the act or omission which invades one's legal
right, as opposed to actual damage, triggers the statute of limitations.25
More specifically, the statute of limitations would begin to run for a
tort as soon as the act or omission occurred, instead of when the plain-
tiff sustained loss, detriment, or harm caused by the tortious
behavior.26
The Nebraska Supreme Court has articulated the purpose of 25-222
as insuring that professional negligence actions will be commenced
soon after the negligent act or omission occurs or is discovered,
thereby granting the defendant an opportunity to defend the claim
and not find applicable defenses eroded by the passage of time.27 Fur-
21. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
22. Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1982).
23. Id.
24. Suzuki v. Holthaus, 221 Neb. 72, 75, 375 N.W.2d 126, 129 (1985)(attorney malprac-
tice); Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 506, 357 N.W.2d 186, 191 (1984)(attorney
malpractice).
25. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 505, 357 N.W.2d 186, 189-91 (1984).
26. Id. at 505, 357 N.W.2d at 189-90.
27. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 501, 357 N.W.2d 186, 188 (1984); Swassing v.
Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 658, 240 N.W.2d 24, 28 (1976).
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ther, statutes of limitation generally promote stability and finality in
human affairs by stimulating action and punishing for delay in filing
claims.28
Section 25-222 has been attacked unsuccessfully on constitutional
grounds seven times29 ; each time the court has focused on who ranks
as a "professional" in its constitutional analysis. In Horn v. Burns and
Roe,30 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided 25-222 was not un-
constitutional and not void on its face because of vagueness and indefi-
niteness.3 1 Horn involved a steamfitter who allegedly was injured as a
result of negligence on the part of an architectural and engineering
firm and an organization of engineers which was responsible for qual-
ity control during the construction of the power plant on which the
plaintiff was working.3 2 The defendants claimed that 25-222 barred
the action and the district court held that architecture and engineer-
ing were "professional" occupations within the meaning of 25-222.33
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague since the terms "professional negligence" and "professional
services" did not convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct.3 4 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, cit-
ing authority that noncriminal statutes are not unconstitutionally
vague if an "ordinary person exercising common sense can sufficiently
understand and fulfill its prescriptions." 35 The court stated that the
more specific language found in 25-222, such as a listing of those pro-
fessions protected, was not necessary because the lack of criminal
sanctions required "less literal exactitude in order to comport with
28. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 501, 357 N.W.2d 186, 188 (1984). See also United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 1M1, 117 (1979)("[T]hey [statutes of limitation] protect
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for
truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or
otherwise."); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)("Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of
laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary
on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."); Note,
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950) ("Another factor [underlying statutes of limitation] may be an estimate of
the effectiveness of the courts, and a desire to relieve them of the burden of adju-
dicating inconsequential or tenuous claims." (footnotes omitted)).
29. See ir fra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
30. 536 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1976).
31. Id. at 254-56.
32. Id. at 253.
33. Id. at 253-54.
34. Id. at 254.
35. Id.
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due process."3 6 The court concluded that the ordinary meaning of the
terms "professional negligence" and "professional services" was not so
vague as to fail to create a standard; therefore, the statute was deemed
constitutional.3 7
The Nebraska Supreme Court also found 25-222 constitutional in
Taylor v. Karrer,3 8 a medical malpractice action. The court stated that
25-222 was not void for vagueness3 9 or unconstitutional as special legis-
lation40 because it was not sufficiently vague or deficient in its terms
to render enforcement impossible.41 Again focusing on the term "pro-
fessional," the court stated that, "although questions may arise as to
who are professionals and what are professional services, we do not
find the statute to be so imperfect or deficient as to render its enforce-
ment impossible."42 Stressing that 25-222 was not unconstitutional as
special legislation, the court also focused on professional people and
pointed to several reasons for discrimination in the professional negli-
gence field.43 One such reason was the increase in malpractice litiga-
tion and high insurance rates, which were unduly burdening the
public in the form of fees.4 4 Equally important, malpractice victims
were often unaware of the malpractice for indefinite lengths of time.45
Therefore, "[t]he situation of professional people and of those to
whom they render services is substantially different from the normal
situation encountered in the rendering of ordinary services and inju-
ries sustained thereby. Public policy dictates diverse legislation in re-
gard to professional services."4 6
This distinction between professionals and those rendering "ordi-
nary services" was affirmed as valid in Colton v. Dewey,47 another
medical malpractice case. Addressing the appellant's argument that
the ten-year period of repose in 25-222 was unconstitutional, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated that under the Nebraska Constitution,48
legislative classifications of people may be made if the classification
rests "upon real differences of situation and circumstances surround-
ing the members of the class." 49 Since there are valid differences be-
tween professional and ordinary services, the period of repose was not
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id. at 256.
38. 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976).
39. Id. at 586, 244 N.W.2d at 204.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 586, 244 N.W.2d at 204-05.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 585-86, 244 N.W.2d at 204.
44. Id. at 586, 244 N.W.2d at 204.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982).
48. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 16 & art. III, § 18.
49. Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 129, 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982).
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special legislation, nor did it violate Nebraska's due process clause5 0 or
the equal protection clause5 1 of the United States Constitution.52 Fi-
nally, the court stated that the open courts provision of the Nebraska
Constitution5 3 did not prohibit the placement of time limits, as in the
25-222 period of repose, on potential plaintiffs.5 4 The ruling regarding
the open courts provision was upheld again in Smith v. Dewey,5 5 a
medical malpractice case, and in Rosnick v. Marks,56 a legal malprac-
tice action, in which the court stated that Colton was dispositive of the
argument that the period of repose in 25-222 denied the plaintiff right
of access to the courts.5 7
It is apparent from the Nebraska Supreme Court's constitutional
analyses, which have focused on the adequacy of the terms "profes-
sional negligence" and "professional services,"5 8 and the difference be-
tween professional and ordinary services, 5 9 that the approach to
interpreting 25-222 has become a definitional game. As the Nebraska
Supreme Court began to apply 25-222 not only to physicians, but to
lawyers,6 0 accountants,61 architects and engineers,6 2 medical techni-
cians,6 3 and to those who offer investment advice by planning em-
50. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 129, 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982).
53. NEB. CoNST. art. I, § 13.
54. Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 129, 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982).
55. 214 Neb. 605, 335 N.W.2d 530 (1983).
56. 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984).
57. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 507, 357 N.W.2d 186, 192 (1984); Smith v. Dewey,
214 Neb. 605, 608, 335 N.W.2d 530,532 (1983). Additional constitutional attacks on
25-222 arose in Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 412 N.W.2d 438 (1987) and Williams
v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235,404 N.W.2d 32 (1987). Based on the previous
decisions regarding the statute's constitutionality, the Nebraska Supreme Court
failed to repeat those constitutional arguments in Kingery and Tylle.
58. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
60. Seagren v. Peterson, 225 Neb. 747,407 N.W.2d 790 (1987); Suzuki v. Holthaus, 221
Neb. 72, 375 N.W.2d 126 (1985); Smith v. Ganz, 219 Neb. 432, 363 N.W.2d 526
(1985); Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984); Sanitary & Im-
provement Dist. No. 145 v. Nye, 216 Neb. 354, 343 N.W.2d 753 (1984); Interholz-
inger v. Estate of Dent, 214 Neb. 264, 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983); Egan v. Bauer, 212
Neb. 212, 322 N.W.2d 413 (1982).
61. Norfolk Iron & Metal v. Behnke, 230 Neb. 414, 432 N.W.2d 18 (1988); Lincoln
Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 (1983). See also
McCook Equity Exchange v. Cooperative Serv. Co., 230 Neb. 758, 433 N.W.2d 509
(1988)(25-222 applied to a corporation which performed auditing and tax services
for Nebraska cooperatives).,
62. Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 230 Neb. 675, 433 N.W.2d 478 (1988);
Georgetowne Ltd. Partnership v. Geotechnical Servs., Inc., 230 Neb. 22, 430
N.W.2d 34 (1988); Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 225 Neb. 235, 404 N.W.2d 32
(1987); Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985).
63. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 (1976).
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ployee benefit programs,64 a definition of "professional" as used in 25-
222 has emerged:
A "professional" act or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupa-
tion, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the
labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than
physical or manual .... In determining whether a particular act is of a profes-
sional nature or a "professional service" we must look not to the title or char-
acter of the party performing the act, but to the act itself.65
C. Tylle v. Zoucha
Most recently, real estate brokers have claimed that they too fall
within the meaning of "professional" in 25-222.66 The case setting the
precedent that real estate brokers do not fit into the classification cre-
ated by the Nebraska Supreme Court's definitional approach to 25-222
was Tylle v. Zoucha.67 Tylle was the plaintiff-appellant who alleged a
real estate broker's negligent failure to sell land by auction, as origi-
nally contracted by the parties.68 The contract required a minimum
auction sale price of $3,000 per acre; if that amount was not offered,
the broker, Zoucha, would have exclusive listing of the property for a
specified time period.69 When the property was not sold at two differ-
ent auctions, Tylle sold the property himself for $2,500 per acre. Tylle
alleged damages of $20,908.70
The district court granted Zoucha's motion for summary judgment
because the action was not brought within the professional negligence
statute of limitations, 25-222.71 After denial of his motion for a new
trial, Tylle appealed, assigning as error the trial court's finding that
Zoucha was a professional, therefore falling under the protection of
25-222.72 The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded73
64. Educational Serv. Unit No. 3 v. Mammael, Olsen, Schropp, Horn & Swartzbaugh,
Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974).
65. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 656,240 N.W.2d 24,27 (1976)(holding that a medi-
cal technician's services were performed within the meaning of 25-222)(emphasis
omitted)(quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 14, 157
N.W.2d 870, 872 (1968)). See also Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir.
1976)(quoting extended version of Nebraska Supreme Court's definition and ap-
plying it to architects and engineers); Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge,
230 Neb. 675, 682-83, 433 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1988)(applying definition to architects);
Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 125, 362 N.W.2d 35, 42 (1985)(ap-
plying definition to architects and engineers).
66. Luby v. CBS Real Estate Co., 226 Neb. 879, 415 N.W.2d 480 (1987); Tylle v.
Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 412 N.W.2d 438 (1987).
67. 226 Neb. 476, 412 N.W.2d 438 (1987).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The Supreme Court focused on whether a real estate broker may
be considered a professional for purposes of 25-222. Looking to other
states for authority, the court cited with favor several cases (many of
which concerned the unrelated topic of zoning law) which answered
the proposition negatively.74 The court then referred to the definition
of professional most often used in Nebraska,75 and stated that whether
an occupation is primarily intellectual or mental rather than manual
or physical should not be the only distinguishing factor.7 6 In its search
for a definition that would not turn on the intellectual-manual distinc-
tion, the court dismissed a definition from the Nebraska Professional
Corporation Act,77 which required a professional service to be one ren-
dered after obtaining a license. The court then turned to Webster's
Dictionary78 for a definition of "professional" which properly stressed
intensive preparation, but did not focus on a intellectual-manual dis-
tinction or the possession of a license:79
4a. a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive
preparation including instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scien-
tific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills and methods,
maintaining by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of
achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and
to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public
service .... 80
On the basis of this definition and case law from other states, the court
held that real estate brokers were not professionals for purposes of 25-
222.81 In answer to the appellant's constitutional concerns, the court
also upheld the statute as not unconstitutionally vague based on the
prior Nebraska cases which established its constitutionality.8 2
The three-judge concurrence83 delivered by Judge Caporale agreed
with the majority's result, but not with its reasoning. Although part
of the concurrence was based on a real estate broker's professional
status, the majority's analytical approach, Judge Caporale focused on
the idea that "professional" was a nebulous term, therefore not creat-
ing a classificatory scheme or meaning of "professional negligence"
within the statute.8 4 The concurrence mentioned the growth of the
74. Id. at 478-79, 412 N.W.2d at 439-40.
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
76. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 480, 412 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1987).
77. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2201 to 21-2222 (1987).
78. WEBsTER's TaiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1811 (1981). See also Jordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) ("If we go to the dictionaries, the last resort
of the baffled judge, we learn little except that the expression is redundant.").
79. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 480, 412 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 480-81, 412 N.W.2d at 441.
82. See supra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
83. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 482, 412 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1987) (Caporale, J.,
Shanahan, J., & Grant, J., concurring).
84. Id.
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term "professional" since the days when only law, medicine, and the-
ology were recognized as such.8a Caporale reasoned that Nebraska
likewise has expanded the definition, as evidenced by the cases per-
mitting architects, engineers, accountants, medical technicians, and in-
vestment advisors to be included in the professional negligence statute
of limitations.8 6
The concurrence also noted that authorities were actually split on
the question of real estate brokers being professionals, with the most
recent authority classifying them as such, contrary to the majority
opinion.8 7 Despite Caporale's conclusion that "professional" is too
nebulous to create a meaning of "professional negligence" within 25-
222,88 the concurrence found that real estate brokers were indeed pro-
fessionals.89 Describing "professional" as "nothing more than an ac-
tivity by which one earns his or her livelihood,"9 0 the concurrence
dismissed the majority's definition of professional,91 as well as the pre-
vious definition favored by the Nebraska Supreme Court.92 From leg-
islative history, Caporale attempted to glean an explanation for 25-222
in the presence of section 25-207,93 providing a four-year limitations
period for tort actions, and section 25-208,94 the two-year statute of
limitation for malpractice actions. Citing only those parts of the his-
tory specifying who would be protected by 25-222,95 Caporale con-
cluded that 25-222 must not have been meant to apply to professions
such as bowling, driving, and wrestling.9 6 If such professions were in-
cluded in the statute, "we would have a 2-year period of limitations for
all negligence claims resulting from one's occupation and a 4-year pe-
riod of limitations for other causes of action based on negligence." 97
The concurrence concluded that the Nebraska Legislature failed to
properly classify those who may benefit by 25-222, thereby requiring
the courts to determine "what there is about various occupational ac-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 483, 412 N.W.2d at 442. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
87. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 483, 412 N.W.2d 438, 442-43 (1987).
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 485, 412 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1987).
90. Id. at 486, 412 N.W.2d at 44 (Caporale, J., concurring).
91. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (1985).
94. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-208 (1985).
95. Statement of Purpose, L.B. 1132, Judiciary Committee, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17,
1972)(physicians, surgeons, and medical personnel need protection); Judiciary
Committee Hearing, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1972)(Sen. Luedtke
stated that the statute "would also cover the lawyers, the architects, and every-
body." Id. at 19).
96. Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 491, 412 N.W.2d 438, 446 (1987) (Caporale, J.,
concurring).
97. Id.
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tivities, if anything, which justifies such preferential treatment."98
Caporale noted that the court's effort in preserving 25-222 by analyz-
ing which occupations fit into the statute on a case-by-case basis was
overly ambitious.99 Further, because the Legislature failed to create a
classification, the court must do more than apply a legislative classifi-
cation to a given set of facts.100
III. ANALYSIS
Tylle is the most recent example of the Nebraska Supreme Court's
definitional approach to interpreting 25-222, as developed by the Ne-
braska cases establishing the constitutionality of 25-222.101 The court
in each of these cases simply decided in the abstract what "profes-
sional" meant by creating or adhering to a particular definition, ap-
plied the definition to the defendant's occupation, and then decided
whether 25-222 was intended to protect that occupation. All of this
was done with little reference to the complete language contained in
the statute, negligence law in general, and the legislative history be-
hind 25-222. By failing to consider these aspects, the Nebraska
Supreme Court created random definitions102 which typically brought
to mind the traditional learned professions. The court could expand
or contract these definitions, depending upon whom the court thought
should be protected by 25-222 on any given day.
A closer look at the language of 25-222, the principles of tort law,
and relevant legislative history reveals that the Nebraska Legislature
intended 25-222 to cover professional negligence claims. This does not
mean negligence of "professionals" in the literal, definitional sense,
but negligence claims based on breach of the professional standard of
care,103 as opposed to the ordinary standard of care,1 0 4 which causes
actual damage. 0 5
A. Statutory Language
Section 25-222 speaks in terms of professional negligence in "ren-
dering or failure to render professional services."106 The Legislature
did not restrict these services to those of physicians, attorneys, archi-
tects, or any particular occupation. If more specificity was intended,
the Legislature would have opted for more concise, exact terminology.
98. Id. at 491-92, 412 N.W.2d at 447.
99. Id. at 492, 412 N.W.2d at 447.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 30-66 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 65 and 80 and accompanying text.
103. W.P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 185-93.
104. Id. at 173-85.
105. Id. § 30, at 165.
106. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
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In addition, because this broad language does not define what types of
"professional services" are included in the statute, it is illogical to ap-
proach statutory interpretation definitionally. This is especially true
because it is the court's duty "to discover, if possible, legislative intent
from the statute itself."107 Why attempt to create definitions describ-
ing "professionals" when there is no evidence from the statutory lan-
guage itself that such a definition is required? The Legislature had a
broader purpose for 25-222-the separation of negligence claims based
on breach of the professional standard of care from ordinary negli-
gence claims.
Various rules of statutory construction further guide how 25-222
should be interpreted. The Nebraska Supreme Court has committed
itself to giving effect to "every word, clause, and sentence of a statute,
since the Legislature is presumed to have intended every provision of
a statute to have a meaning."108 In addition, "lilt is not within the
province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not war-
ranted by the legislative language."109 It is clear from the line of deci-
sions establishing the statute's constitutionality ending with Tylle the
Nebraska Supreme Court has focused solely on the word "profes-
sional" without reference to the phrase "professional negligence" as a
whole." 0 According to 25-222, the limitation period applies to actions
based on "alleged professional negligence,"l not simply actions
against professionals. The court has violated the above rules of con-
struction by considering only whether the action involves a "profes-
sional," instead of recognizing the key phrase "professional
negligence." Professional negligence is a term of art used to describe
negligence actions based on breach of the professional standard of
care, thereby causing actual damage.'1 2 If effect had been given to
every word of this phrase, starting with the 25-222 constitutionality
cases,113  the court's definitional approach would have been
unnecessary.
Other guidelines which determine how the Nebraska Supreme
Court should interpret 25-222 include sensible, as opposed to literal,
interpretation,1 4 and avoidance of absurd results.115 An absurd result
107. NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Ass'n, 219 Neb. 296, 299, 363 N.W.2d 362, 365
(1985).
108. Sorensen v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 463, 370 N.W.2d 173, 177 (1985).
109. County of Douglas v. Board of Regents, 210 Neb. 573, 577, 316 N.W.2d 62, 65
(1982)(quoting Bachus v. Swanson, 179 Neb. 1, 3-4, 136 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1965)).
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 30-100 and accompanying text.
114. Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 183 Neb. 410, 419, 160
N.W.2d 232, 238 (1968)(quoting Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43 N.J. 390, 408, 204 A.2d
853, 862 (1964)).
115. Adkisson v. City of Columbus, 214 Neb. 129, 134, 333 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1983).
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will indeed be created if the court continues to attempt to classify
every occupational category which comes before the court arguing a
25-222 defense as "professional." In such a situation, the litigation
would be endless. As the public's perception and definition of "profes-
sional" changes over time, the court's definition will undoubtedly
change, as it did in Tylle. Each time the definition changes, the court
extends an invitation tolitigate. Because the definition cannot remain
static, new occupations will attempt to fit into the new definition if
they had been rejected previously from the former definition.
Looking to other states' approaches to this problem is of little help.
North Carolina is the only state which has a statute similar in lan-
guage to Nebraska's 25-222. However, the North Carolina statute fo-
cuses on "malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to
perform professional services,"116 as opposed to "alleged professional
negligence . . . in rendering or failure to render professional serv-
ices,"1 M7 the language used in 25-222. Like Nebraska, the North Caro-
lina courts have taken a classificatory approach to the statute by
defining which professionals fall within the statute.118 However, un-
like Nebraska, the North Carolina courts have a basis on which to re-
sort to a definitional approach, as their statute speaks of "professional
services" instead of "professional negligence." Only the latter term
has a settled meaning in the law of torts.119 Because Nebraska's 25-
222 refers to "professional negligence,"32 0 the statute should be inter-
preted based upon the tort meaning, instead of a definition of
"professional."
B. Principles of Professional Negligence
Many statutes not dealing with torts attempt classification of "pro-
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983).
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
118. See Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C.
230, 238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1985)("Section 15(c) is broad enough to encompass
professionals other than those in health care. We do not, however, read the stat-
ute to mean that all persons who arguably may be labeled 'professionals' neces-
sarily fall within its ambit .... The legislature, we believe, intended the statute
to apply to malpractice claims against all professionals who are not dealt with
more specifically by some other statute."); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Odell
Assocs., Inc., 61 N.C. App. 350, 361, 301 S.E.2d 459, 465 (1983)("We do not quarrel
with applying G.S. 1-15(c) to architects. The statute does not limit the professions
to which it applies, but covers 'malpractice arising out of the performance or fail-
ure to perform professional services.' Architecture is undoubtedly a profes-
sion."), petition denied, 309 N.C. 319, 306 S.E.2d 791 (1983); Roberts v. Durham
County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 537, 289 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1982)('Even if the
statute may be vague as to certain classes of occupations, it is not vague as to these
defendants, a doctor and a hospital."), aff'd, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983).
119. See supr notes 112 and 103-05 and accompanying text.
120. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
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fessionals" using criteria such as level of training or continuous use of
intellectual skills, or simply listing various occupations. 12 1 "However
valuable such listings may be in the areas of corporation, immigration,
or labor law, the demands of tort law require a rather different ap-
proach." 22 This approach has been articulated in the Restatement:
as a duty of care which distinguishes the "reasonable man of ordinary
prudence"' 2 4 from one undertaking a profession or a skilled trade:
§ 299A. Undertaking in Profession or Trade
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is re-
quired to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of
that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities. 12 5
In relation to the elements of a negligence claim (breach of a duty
to conform to a standard of care which proximately causes actual dam-
age),12 this provision represents the standard of conduct required of a
person of superior knowledge, skill, learning, experience, training, or
intelligence who undertakes rendering services to others.127 This
standard of care applies to the practice of a profession or skilled
trade.128 The Nebraska courts have applied this standard to den-
tists,129 architects,130 a wheat and millet thresher,'13 an auto wrecker
operator, 3 2 and a termite inspection service.1 33 Therefore, it appears
that the Nebraska Supreme Court recognizes the existence of the pro-
fessional standard of care, but has simply failed to link it to the profes-
sional negligence language in 25-222.'34
121. Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 630 (1973)(in-depth
analysis of professional negligence law).
122. Id.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
124. W.P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 173-85.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
126. W.P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 30, at 164-65.
127. Id. § 32, at 185-93; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
129. Mangiameli v. Ariano, 126 Neb. 629, 635, 253 N.W. 871, 874 (1934).
130. Karna v. Byron Reed Syndicate #4, 374 F. Supp. 687 (D. Neb. 1974).
131. Van Nortwick v. Holbine, 62 Neb. 147, 148, 86 N.W. 1057, 1057 (1901).
132. Brown v. Kaar, 178 Neb. 524, 529, 134 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1965).
133. Doupnik v. Usher Pest Control Co., 217 Neb. 1, 3, 346 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1984). For
decisions in other states involving a professional standard of care see Chambers v.
Western Ariz. CATV, 130 Ariz. 605, 607, 638 P.2d 219, 221 (1981)(cable installers);
Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil & Plant Laboratory, Inc., 119 Ariz. 78, 81-82,
579 P.2d 582, 586 (1978)(laboratory); Horak v. Biris, 130 111. App. 3d 140, 145-46,
474 N.E.2d 13, 18 (1985)(social worker); Erlich v. First Nat'l Bank, 208 N.J. Super.
264, 291, 505 A.2d 220, 234 (1984)(investment advisory services); Fantini v. Alex-
ander, 172 N.J. Super. 105, 108, 410 A.2d 1190, 1192 (1980) (per curiam) (karate
instructor); Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 158, 163, 252 S.E.2d 526, 529
(1979)(pilot), petition denied, 297 N.C. 453, 256 S.E.2d 806 (1979).
134. But see Nebraska Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Ne-
braska Jury Instructions, Duty of One Rendering Professional and Skilled-Trade
Services-In General, Instruc. 12.04 & comment, at 699 (1989) (links professional
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The closest the Nebraska Supreme Court has come to recognizing
this professional standard of care in the context of 25-222 was in Ros-
nick v. Marks,ls a case involving interpretation of 25-222. The court
referred to a "degree of professional skill" and "breach of professional
duty"13 6 and said that "[in conjunction with § 25-222 every profes-
sional has a duty to render services in a reasonable and prudent man-
ner. A negligent breach of that professional duty invades a legal right
of one entitled to receive negligence-free services."137 However, the
court failed to mention or recognize a professional standard of care as
related to professional negligence and instead focused on reasonable
and prudent behavior, the standard of care for ordinary negligence
claims.
Because 25-222 is based on negligence, and negligence is based upon
breach of standard of care, it is clear that determining who is a "pro-
fessional" should have no bearing upon whom 25-222 protects. The
statute should instead apply to those who have breached the profes-
sional standard of care to which they are held by virtue of their supe-
rior knowledge, skill, learning, experience, training, or intelligence in
undertaking to render services to others. 38 Unlike the Nebraska
Supreme Court's random definitional approach to 25-222, the profes-
sional standard of care concept is based on the law of negligence. Neg-
ligence law is certainly more definite and widely recognized than is a
vacillating definition of "professional." Under the professional stan-
dard of care approach, multitudes of cases stemming from section
299A139 could serve as authority for determining who should be held
to a professional standard of care. This would reveal who should be
extended coverage under 25-222.
C. Legislative History of 25-222
Legislative Bill 1132 was introduced "to redefine the period of limi-
tations for actions based upon malpractice or professional negli-
gence."140 The stated purpose of the bill focused upon suits against
medical personnel,141 but the floor debate42 and committee records143
standard of care to 25-222, and provides list of professions to which the elevated
standard of care applies).
135. 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984).
136. Id. at 506, 357 N.W.2d at 191.
137. Id. at 505, 357 N.W.2d at 190.
138. W.P. KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 185-93; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 299A (1965).
139, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
140. L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (1972); 1972 Neb. Laws 637.
141.
The purpose of this bill is to provide certain conditions when statute
of limitations [sic] shall run against malpractice suits which may be
brought against medical personnel. This bill would provide in any action
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indicate that the bill was not intended solely for the benefit of physi-
cians or any other of the "learned professions."144 The only certain
facet of this part of the legislative history is that physicians definitely
were to be extended protection.145
The legislative history also evidences an intent to separate profes-
sional negligence claims based on breach of the professional standard
of care from ordinary negligence claims in 25-222. Mr. Flavel Wright,
to recover damages for professional negligence in the medical field by
medical personnel.... It safeguards the patient ....
... Physicians and surgeons need some type [sic] protection to pre-
vent actions being brought long after the incident of alleged malpractice
took place, when the incident is so remote that it is difficult for the phy-
sician or surgeon to protect h imself [sic], and defend himself, from the
charges because the evidence has been lost, the witnesses who would
know are gone, no defense is available because the defenses which ex-
isted have been erased by the passage of time.
Introducer's Statement of Purpose, L.B. 1132, Judiciary Committee, 82d Leg., 2d
Sess. (1972).
The purpose of this bill is to change the present law, which places a
statute of limitation on the bringing of certain actions. This is specifi-
cally directed to placing a limit on the time actions may be brought by
the person who claims damages for injuries received for malpractice, or
negligence either by commission or ommission [sic] on the part of
physicians.
Committee Statement, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 31, 1972).
142. SENATOR LUEDTKE [Chairman of Judiciary Committee]: "It [L.B. 1132] pro-
tects doctors in this particular case and other professional people."
SENATOR CARSTENS [Introducer of L.B. 1132]: "[T]his bill places a limitation
on the time in which an action or generally supposed mal practice [sic] may be
brought against professional individuals such as doctors or any professional li-
censed practitioners. This primarily is a malpractice limitation bill on the medi-
cal profession." Floor Debate, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 25, 1972).
143. FLAVEL WRIGHT [Attorney representing the Nebraska State Medical Associa-
tion, appearing in favor of L.B. 1132]: "It has been suggested that there was an
earlier bill which was considered by this committee a year or so ago, and in that
case, I think it related generally just to the medical malpractice cases and pro-
vided a four year [sic] period of time. This bill has been broadened to include all
professional negligence, which includes malpractice cases against lawyers, archi-
tects, many professional people. I think it is necessary that it be that broad."
SENATOR LUEDTKE: "This would also cover the lawyers, the architects, and
everybody."
MR. WRIGHT: "Right."
Judiciary Committee Records, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1972).
144. "Formerly, theology, law, and medicine were specifically known as the profes-
sions." United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896) (emphasis in original).
145. The Nebraska Legislature enacted the Hospital-Medical Liability Act, NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 44-2801 to -2855 (1984), subsequent to passage of 25-222. The Act specifi-
cally protects physicians in malpractice claims. In addition, it contains a statute
of limitations nearly identical to 25-222, NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1984). This
indicates that the language of 25-222 itself applies to others since physicians are
covered by the Hospital-Medical Liability Act.
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an attorney who helped draft L.B. 1132 in his representative capacity
for the Nebraska State Medical Association,146 spoke in favor of the
professional negligence statute of limitations.14 7 He clearly separated
ordinary from professional negligence in his explanation of the bill.
[I]n an ordinary negligence case ... you've got four years [to bring action].
You've got five years in a contract case. You've got ten years if somebody is
claiming your real estate.
[A] malpractice case .... a professional negligence case, is one that is based
upon the failure of the person performing special service to render the degree
of care that is ordinarily rendered by accepted practitioners in his service, in
his area, or in similar areas in the country. If he fails to render that quality
of service, he is then guilty of malpractice, or, in effect, causes damage, then a
cause of action arises. This would cover malpractice cases, generally.1 4 8
Because of Mr. Wright's paraphrasing of section 299A149 (indicated in
italics above), it appears that L.B. 1132, enacted in 25-222, was concep-
tualized as a statute covering professional negligence actions based on
breach of the professional standard of care, as opposed to one applied
to a particular set of professions. Even if the legislative history ap-
pears somewhat unclear as to which interpretation of 25-222 should
follow-defining professionals or using the professional standard of
care-the latter is the best assumption. Logically, the best choice
would be to create an approach to 25-222 based on well-recognized
negligence principles, as opposed to one depending on a casual social
definition of "professional" which changes as society changes.
IV. CONCLUSION
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425
(1918)(Holmes, J.)
The Nebraska Supreme Court's attempt to define "professional" as
the answer to the issue of who 25-222 protects is, at best, a temporary
solution to a problem which will continue to plague the court if this
interpretative approach is continued. As more occupations develop
self-regulatory standards or licensing procedures in an effort to be-
146. Telephone interview with Flavel A. Wright, attorney (Sept. 12, 1988). As attor-
ney for the Nebraska State Medical Association, Mr. Wright helped draft L.B.
1132. The Medical Association was the main force behind the bill.
147. Senator Carstens, introducer of L.B. 1132, allowed Mr. Flavel Wright to explain
the bill to the Judiciary Committee: "[M]y name is Fred Carstens, introducer of
LB 1132. Since time is wasting and we have witnesses who would like to leave to
catch a plane, I'm going to dispense with any explanation and turn it over to
Flavel Wright to avoid repetition. I will waive closing." Judiciary Committee
Records, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1972).
148. Judiciary Committee Records, L.B. 1132, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17,1972)(empha-
sis added).
149. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 299A (1965).
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come "professionals,"15o whatever definition the court devises must
continually change.15-
The correct conceptual approach to interpreting the reach of 25-222
is to conclude from both the key phrase "professional negligence,"152 a
term of art based on tort law, and from the legislative history that the
Nebraska Legislature intended to separate claims for damage based on
a breach of the professional standard of care 15 3 from ordinary negli-
gence claims based on the reasonable person standard of care.lM It
seems logical that a legislature creating a statute based on negligence
would classify the claims falling under it according to standard of care,
an element of negligence,155 rather than focusing on a group of people
with multiple educational degrees or licenses.
Interpreting 25-222 in this manner would assuage Judge Caporale's
concerns in his Tylle concurrence. 156 Caporale was correct in his
statement that the word "professional" alone is nebulous, and that 25-
222 does not create a classificatory scheme based on occupation.157 If
an interpretation based on breach of the professional standard of care
is used, such definitions and schemes are unnecessary. Similarly,
Caporale observed that the term "professional" has grown over time
to mean "nothing more than an activity by which one earns his or her
livelihood." 5 8 Why try to capture the meaning in a temporary defini-
tion which will be continually challenged?
Janine E. Rempe '90
150. "Formerly, theology, law, and medicine were specifically known as the profes-
sions; but as the applications of science and learning are extended to other de-
partments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name." United States v.
Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896)(emphasis in original).
151. "Words, like men, grow an individuality; their character changes with years and
with use." Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 472, 167 N.E. 705, 706 (1929)(Crane, J.),
reh'g denied, 252 N.Y. 574, 170 N.E. 148 (1929).
152. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
153. See supra notes 103 and 127-38 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 104 and 124 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
156. Tylle v Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 482, 412 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1987).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 486, 412 N.W.2d at 444.
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